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IS THE SELF REALLY THAT KIND OF ILLUSION?
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ABSTRACT: Karsten Struhl has offered an intriguing account of what kind of illusion the
self is. His account is based on Buddhist philosophy, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. This
critical notice examines his arguments, and aims to question whether or not the self is the kind
of illusion Struhl argues it to be.
Keywords: Buddhist Illusionism, Cognitive Penetration, Karsten Struhl, neuropsychology, self

1. WHAT IS BEING DENIED BY BUDDHISTS?
Karsten Struhl’s, “What Kind of Illusion is the Illusion of the Self?” is a delightful
examination and defense of Buddhist illusionism about the self. In particular, it is about
how Buddhist illusionism about the self can be understood by looking at some ideas
about the self and illusions in neuropsychology and neuroscience.
The point of departure for Struhl’s view is an account of what Buddhists deny when
they announce the doctrine of no self (anattā). After listing out different notions of the
self, he maintains the following:
These various features are interwoven into our general concept of the self. Thus, what is
being denied by Buddhism is the existence of a substantial, unchanging, independent and
unitary entity with an essential core which is both the subject and possessor of my
experiences and body, while yet distinct from them, which separates what is me from what
is not me, and which is also the agent that controls my actions, desires, and thoughts. The
belief that we have such a self is for Buddhism, a cognitive illusion. (Struhl 2020, 115;
emphasis added)
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Without specifying a specific school or thinker in a school it is often hard to say
what “Buddhists” believe. While I find Struhl’s account of Buddhism familiar from
various sources, I am worried that this account of what Buddhism denies is vague in so
far as it does not specify enough thinkers from various schools and what their specific
arguments were. If there is a core to what Buddhists deny, across all schools, I would
be inclined to say that it is what Hindus claim there is: a permanent self. Something
that exists at all times. All Buddhists deny that. Even if the Buddha, arguably, does not
explicitly say it. And if there is a close second that all Buddhists deny, it would be that
we have complete cognitive control over our decisions and actions, something Struhl
does discuss via a specific thinker. However, whether they all think the self is
momentary or that there is no subject of experience at a given moment is something
that varies across schools. While both Abhidharma and Yogacārā are anti-realist
schools of a certain kind, Yogacārā is much different than its predecessor Abhidharma.
Surprisingly, Struhl emphasizes our conception of the self, but Buddhists weren’t
engaging our (modern) concept(s). Rather, they were rejecting Hindu conceptions at
first, which involve the notion of permanence.
As Struhl notes there are about nine different notions of the self that a Buddhist
from a specific school could be denying. My reason for bringing this list up is that it
seems that the reasons that go into showing that one kind of self is an illusion don’t
automatically transfer over to saying that another kind of self is an illusion. For
example, just because there isn’t a permanent self across time, it won’t follow that there
isn’t an independent self for some portion of time. Of course, the doctrine of dependent
origination helps us see how the independent self is an illusion, but that doctrine doesn’t
show us that there isn’t a permanent self across time. For example, if everything is
permanent, because change is the illusion, yet dependent, then we have a model on
which independence is an illusion, but permanence is not. Definitions matter, and there
are subtle arguments that need to be made. So, when one wants to argue that the self is
an illusion it is important to keep two things in mind. First, what notion of the self is at
stake. Second, what kind of illusion is in play. Struhl is careful to do that. However, at
least with respect to the first notion, that of the self, I worry that he assumes a notion
of the self that really isn’t articulated in totality or argued against in totality by any one
thinker or school of thought in Buddhism, maybe Nāgārjuna, but I doubt it.
Nevertheless, Struhl is operating with a familiar picture that is popular in Buddhist
Modernism, as discussed for example in Evan Thompson’s recent Why I am not a
Buddhist.1My point is that showing that the self isn’t permanent in time, because
everything changes, or that the self isn’t independent, because everything is
dependently originated isn’t sufficient for showing that there is no controller self or
subject of experience that last longer than a moment. Arguments that show one kind of
self is an illusion often times don’t transfer over to other notions of the self. Struhl
needs a battery of arguments that are consistent with one another to show that his notion
of the self is completely an illusion.

1

See Thompson 2020.
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Finally, it is important to say something about a popular Buddhist argument against
the existence of a permanent self, the argument from changing parts.2 According to this
argument there are five aggregates that constitute an individual person. And
importantly, as Struhl points out, Buddhists hold that these five aggregates are
exhaustive. There is nothing to an individual person that cannot be accounted for via
the five aggregates. It is then argued that since the parts all change over time nothing
is permanent in time. This is a great argument, and it bears deep reflection. But it is
open to a direct attack that is very clear.
Some Buddhists move as follows: if there are only five parts and all of them change
at some time, then there is no permanent self. But one can simply accept the conclusion
and move to the following adjusted position. All the parts change and there is no
permanent self, but there is a semi-permanent self that is not identical to one of the five
parts, since we need to account for cognitive control and decision making, and
diachronic knowledge. On my view Buddhists were correct to criticize Hindu schools
for thinking there is a permanent self, like a soul, that exists at all times. But from that
fact it won’t follow that there is no kind of self that remains, which has some of the
relevant properties, such as control, in a semi-permanent way. The move some
Buddhists make holds that there is no permanent self, since each of the five parts
changes over time. But: couldn’t there be a semi-permanent self, something that exits
for longer than a moment, and for less than all time? For example, Husserl, see his
phenomenology of internal-time consciousness3, tells us that time consciousness has a
pro-tension and re-tension structure, which must have a duration. Couldn’t an
investigation into the phenomenology of time be used as an argument that goes against
the no duration view of momentariness? Of course not every Buddhist will fall victim
to Husserl’s position, since momentariness is important for Abhidharmikas, but might
not be for Madhyamikas.
Once again, on the view I advocate, the self is a phase of a person. Something that
exists for some amount of time, but not for all time, and is subject to change as well,
but serves other important cognitive roles during each phase, such as decision making
and being the subject of experience, accounting for diachronic knowledge, such as
when one touches what they saw over time and recognize that it is the same thing.4
Moreover, we can grant that Buddhists have a great argument against Hindu schools
that defended a permanent unchanging self. But those arguments fall short of showing
that there is no sense of self at all that has some duration in time, longer than a moment
and less than forever. I am confident that some Buddhists would respond to my
arguments and my position by pointing to the doctrine of two truths, where there is a
distinction between what is conventionally real and what is ultimately real. I grant that
Buddhists would point out that my view is one that is only conventionally real, but not
ultimately real. I would challenge them to provide a semantics for the truth predicate
that is consistent across a two-level view.
2

See Pesala 2009.
See Husserl 1928/1964.
4
See Chakrabarti 1992.
3

Comparative Philosophy 12.1 (2021)

VAIDYA

173

2. WHAT KIND OF ILLUSION?
Struhl argues that there are many types of illusions. He distinguishes between three
kinds of illusions.
Motivational illusions are false beliefs that are not based on evidence, but rather by
our desire for them to be true. If I believe that the Chicago Bears will win the superbowl
in two years, simply because I desire it, and not based on any evidence, then what I
believe is an illusion in the sense of how it is motivated. Cognitive illusions, are false
beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality that are unexamined by most of us, and
they are very difficult to dislodge. Moreover, they don’t arise simply due to our desires.
Even though I believe that space is flat because it looks that way, contemporary physics
tells me that it is curved. Yet, it is really easy for me to fall back into that belief in many
contexts. Thus, I am under a cognitive illusion. Phenomenal illusions, in contrast to the
other two, are not beliefs, but on Struhl’s account they often lead to beliefs. Struhl’s
example of a phenomenal illusion is the Kanizsa-square illusion, figure 2 below.
Because there is no square present, but most of us see one.

Figure 2
I will speak about phenomenal illusions at length in the final section. For now, I
want to take note of a disagreement between Struhl and I about his categorization of
the three types of illusions.
Concerning these three types, Struhl says the following.
While analytically, it is useful to keep the three senses of illusion separate, they will in
practice often be conjoined. Beliefs motivated by strong wishes are often strongly
supported by cognitive illusions, and such cognitive illusions are often generated by basic
intuitions or feelings based on the way our mind organizes our experiences. Thus, if the
self is an illusion, the belief that it exists may be derived from basic human wishes,
reinforced by beliefs that are cognitive illusions, and grounded in our phenomenal intuition
of self, what may be called our “I” sense, that cannot be dissolved without the aid of special
meditative techniques. (Struhl 2020, 120)
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I find this quite troubling. I think that the former two notions are not even illusions.
The core notion of “illusion” that I take seriously is perceptual and based on the
classical Indian philosophical notion of something being presented other than it is,
which is much discussed by the 13th century father of Navya-Nyāya, Gaṅgeśa.5 Let’s
take a familiar example from Vedānta and Nyāya, the rope that is perceived as a snake,
the rope-snake case.
The rope is what is, while the snake is what I see; thus the rope is presented
otherwise than it is to me. I have the illusion that a snake is there because the rope is
presented otherwise. Freudian illusions, which Struhl appeals to in his account of
motivational illusions, is, for me, a misuse of the term ‘illusion’. When I believe
without evidence that the Chicago Bears will win in two years, we have a case of hope
or faith. I have faith, against the odds, that they will win, or I hope that they will win,
against the odds I have examined, but not appraised rationally. But if I have appraised
the evidence, then I don’t have a belief in the proper sense. I have something belief like
bordering on hope. Cognitive illusions aren’t illusions for me either. Rather, they are
just states of mind we deploy in various navigational activities. For example, they are
states of mind that have a utility for us. Struhl doesn’t defend why they must be labeled
as beliefs. Simply put, neither motivational nor cognitive illusions are illusions for me.
And that is significant for the purposes of investigating whether or not the self can be
an illusion in a certain sense. For the self to be an illusion, on my account, it has to be
the case that there is something that is presented otherwise to a subject of experience.
To make this clear, consider the following claims using the rope-snake case as the
paradigm.
1. The rope is real, and presented otherwise as a snake to my consciousness.
2. The impermanent self* is real, and presented otherwise as permanent to my
consciousness.
3. The dependent self* is real, and presented otherwise as independent to my
consciousness.
4. The uncontrolled, undeciding self* is real, and presented otherwise as a
controlling and deciding mind to my consciousness.
If self*, understood here as an impermanent-dependent-uncontrolling process6, is
real, and the properties of permanence, independence, and control are what are
presented otherwise to my consciousness, we need to ask: how is that magic trick done?
For example: when in my conscious experience do I ever experience the self as
permanent and existing at all times? For me to experience that, I would have to be
monitoring something all the time, but I am not. Furthermore, if the analogy with the
rope-snake case holds, then the illusion works as follows. The rope is real, the snake
the illusion to my consciousness. So, the impermanent self* as process is real, and
5

See Phillips 2011.
‘Self*’ is not a notion of the self that Buddhists are engaging. It is just a position that I am using to get
a version of how the analogy with the rope-snake case might go, by having something, self*, with certain
properties, being presented otherwise.

6
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permanence as a property is the illusion presented to my consciousness. But if that is
how it goes, I must experience in my consciousness, directly and not by inference, the
permanence, just as I do the snake. But just as Hume doubted that anyone perceives
themselves constantly when they look inside7, I doubt anyone has the experience of
sensing their permanence in time. If you are not constantly monitoring yourself and
you don’t exist for all times, how do you perceive that? It would be like saying even
when you are not looking at the rope, you still see the snake-illusion.
Likewise, if the dependent self* is real, and the independent self is presented
otherwise to my consciousness, then I should be able to experience the independent
self, just as I do the snake. But do I experience the independent self? I clearly
experience myself as both dependent and independent. I am born attached to my
mother. I experience that phenomenally and non-conceptually when I was feeding in
my mother’s womb. I am raised with others around me who I am “dependent” upon
both in my everyday engagement, movement, and guidance, as well as legally. When
do I experience myself as an independent self? Maybe in America where rugged
“individualism” is at play, one does experience an independence as an adult who has a
job and is living away from their nuclear family. But that doesn’t seem to be what the
Buddhist were up to. Maybe I experience myself as independent in the sense that I don’t
feel myself attached to anyone. But that trades on an error. I don’t feel physically
attached to anyone, but I do feel emotionally attached to many people in a dependent
way. Maybe it is a metaphysical point Struhl is after. From an adult reflective and
phenomenological point of view I experience myself as a three-dimensional object that
is wholly present at a given time. Maybe that is the sense in which I experience my
independence. However, this also seems wrong. Since I don’t really experience that.
Rather, I experience being me, and relative to a definition of ‘dependence’ and
‘independence’ I can analyze myself as falling into one of those categories. But I surely
don’t have the illusion of being independent in the way in which I have the illusion that
there is a snake before me, which is present directly in my experience without analysis.
It is activated by my fear of snakes, and it controls my navigation, even though it is an
illusion. Just because I see myself as an object with boundaries doesn’t mean that I am
independent of other things. All the states in the US have a boundary, they are still
dependent on the American Government.
Finally, if complete control is the illusion based on something that has no control,
that is odd. In order to have the concept of control, I have to acquire it from something
where genuine control is present. However, if genuine control isn’t present in the self
at all, then it isn’t present anywhere. If no one has self-control, then no one exerting
control on others is controlling them. Control can only come from an agent, and if all
agent’s lack control, then there is nothing that answers to the concept of control, so how
would I have got the concept so that I have an illusion of it? Note: to have the illusion
of a snake, I should have experienced snakes before. And to have the illusion of a hare
with horns, I at least have to have an experience of the parts, hares and horns, which I
then recombine in my imagination. So, how do we get the concept of complete control,
7

Hume 1739/2003.
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such that something which has no control can present it to their own consciousness?
Perhaps, we did it by extrapolation on analogy with the hare with horns case. For
example, we generated a concept of complete control by extrapolation from limited
control. What we experience is limited control, and what we extrapolate is complete
control. But can this really make sense, if the view is that control is an illusion.
Wouldn’t limited control have to be an illusion as well? While one can concede that
complete control is an illusion, it seems difficult to say that all control is an illusion.
And if we have at least limited control, what is the point of showing that control is an
illusion. For, if we are dependently originated, then it would seem that we only could
have limited control. Furthermore, while phenomenology might lead us to think we
have complete control sometimes, reflection reveals to some that we have limited
control and not complete control. For when does anyone actually feel like they have
complete control? Don’t we generally concede that whatever control one has at a
moment is based in part on prior conditioning, and as a consequence is limited by it. If
that holds, then what needs to be shown to be an illusion is limited control.
In a way my questions are intentionally juvenile. I want to show how jarring
Buddhist illusionism can sound to ordinary reflection. I grant that it might be liberating,
but it is also jarring.
Struhl reaches out beyond Buddhism to makes sense of the illusion of the self he
finds in it. He reaches out to contemporary philosophers, such as Thomas Metzinger,
who is deeply informed by cognitive neuroscience. He finds Metzinger’s flightsimulator analogy telling, helpful, and a support for illusionism about the self that
resonates with Buddhism. Here is a central claim about the self as an illusion that
Metzinger makes.
The human brain can be compared to a modern flight simulator in several respects. Like a
flight simulator, it constructs and continuously updates an internal model of external reality
by using a continuous stream of input supplied by the sensory organs and employing past
experience as a filter….For us, phenomenal reality is not a simulation space constructed
by our brains…[I]t is the world we live in. It is virtually hidden, whereas a flight simulator
is easily recognized as a flight simulator. (Metzinger 2009, 107)

Here is a simple question I would like to raise for Metzinger and Struhl. If the self
is an illusion modeled on the flight simulator as described above, how does anyone
know that? What is the theory of diachronic knowledge that allows one to say: there
are no selves, such that someone has come to know that and can tell that to all these
other things that don’t have selves? Where is the knowledge based when it is acquired
by Metzinger, and to whom is it transmitted? Is the base an illusion as well? It is
common sense to think that when I go to school to learn something, and pass an exam,
that it is me who knows. By this ‘me who knows’ I mean that were I to be downloaded
onto a computer and transferred from my brain to another brain I would only be the
same person if the brain to which I was transferred also had the same knowledge and
skills to a reasonable degree of similarity (say 85% preservation). Brains house selves,
but selves are not identical to brains, since neurological parts change over time while
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selves remain the same through some of these changes. The flight simulator makes
sense, because there are entities outside of it, that are not flight simulators that can
interpret them in a way that makes sense of the illusions they use to be simulators.
On my view, simulators have derived intentionality, not original intentionality.
What do these terms mean? Words have derived intentionality. The word ‘cat’ refers
to cats in English and is about cats because certain people, English speakers, use the
word that way. The people that use ‘cat’ that way have original intentionality, the power
to make the word ‘cat’ refer to cats and be about cats. Simulators have derived
intentionality because, we created them to simulate something, flight. We have original
intentionality, simulators have derived intentionality. Moreover, it is metaphysically
impossible for there to be illusions all the way down. I believe in the asymmetric
dependence of error on truth. For an illusion to occur, there must have been a nonillusion in the first place. While Buddhists might dislike this view, many members of
the Nyāya school embrace it.8
3. EXTINGUISHING THE ILLUSION OF THE SELF
Struhl says, “Extinguishing the illusion of the self would require dispelling not just the
attachment to the idea of the self at the cognitive level, but also the more primal
appearance of self at the phenomenal level” (2020: 129). Before I engage Struhl’s work
on extinguishing the illusion of the self, I need to reiterate the point from the prior
section. Consider the rope-snake case again. From a distance I see the rope as a snake
because ropes look similar to snakes objectively and my fear of the latter triggers a foul
up in my perceptual processing such that I see a snake instead of a rope. However, that
illusion fades as I come close. When I get close to the rope the snake illusion fades
because the perceptual system cannot make the same mistake. The properties of the
rope that differentiate it from a snake override the probability of the snake foul up, even
though their tubular shape is objectively similar. When close, no snake illusion, when
far, some probability of snake illusion, given a fear of snakes. In addition, there is a
self for whom a snake was once perceived and is no longer perceived. The self, need
not be permanent in time, independent of everything else in the world, or in complete
control of all decisions. The self might simply be a phase of a person that can account
for diachronic knowledge change, which is distinct from the five aggregates. We might
call such a conception of the self: the epistemic agential self. Importantly, it is the base
that accounts for an epistemic perceptual change from seeing a snake at location l to
seeing a rope at l and revising one’s beliefs in light of such a change. If this is plausible,
we can directly ask in the case of extinguishing the illusion of the self: for whom is the
illusion extinguished epistemically? For the extinguishing of an illusion is a case of
diachronic knowledge change. Consider the analogy.

8

Dasti 2012.
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Snake-illusion
1. S is such that at t1 a snake is perceived at l.
2. S is such that at t2 a rope is perceived at l.
3. In light of the change in what is perceived at l, S comes to believe that she was
the subject of an illusion based on a theory of illusion and what is perceived at
l at t2.
Self-illusion
4. S is such that at t1 a self is perceived at l (within S’s body).
5. S is such that at t2 no self is perceived at l (within S’s body).
6. In light of the change in what is perceived at l, S comes to believe that she was
the subject of an illusion based on a theory of illusion and what is perceived at
l at t2.
In the snake-illusion it makes sense to say: S came to believe that she was the
subject of an illusion based on what she saw and a theory of illusion. By analogy, it
would appear that we can say the following in the self-illusion: S came to believe that
she was the subject of an illusion based on what she saw and a theory of illusion. But
if that goes through we have a problem. In the snake-illusion I would say that S is a self
that had an epistemic change in light of perceptual change. By analogy, I would then
say, S is a self that had an epistemic change in light of perceptual change. But then: for
whom has the illusion of the self been extinguished? Perhaps, Struhl is inclined to say
that the S that remains is merely a function of grammar alone. The analogical argument
only looks strong because of grammar, the subject-predicate form. I concede that this
response is available. However, it is not convincing. For independently of grammar, I
have argued that there are epistemic subjects, epistemic selves, who can undergo a
change in view. Diachronic knowledge change is real. So, although the grammar of
how I am writing favors my position, the mere fact that the grammar does so is not an
argument against the view. What is needed is a powerful epistemology, one that
Buddhist philosophers, such as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti developed and
defended. Struhl’s work could be more complete were he to reference and engage these
thinkers as well as their contemporary commentators, such as John Dunne.9
A final comment I will make on the epistemic self aims to address Struhl’s use of
Robert Wright’s description of Buddhism. Struhl notes that Wright10 holds to the view
that Buddhism should be described as “the view from nowhere,” a term also used by
Nagel11 as the title of one of his books, something Struhl is aware of. But Wright’s
description of Buddhism pivots into the problem I am raising. Use of ‘the view from
nowhere’ leads to explicit confusion. The view from nowhere is an abstraction from
9

Dunne 2004.
Wright 2017.
11
Nagel 1986.
10
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actual views upon views. A three-dimensional creature, such as a human, can look upon
a two-dimensional creature,12 and say of them, “wow they can only move in two
dimensions.” By abstraction a three-dimensional creature can imagine a creature in
four-dimensions looking down upon them and observing the limitations of their
viewpoint. And the analogy can continue infinitely and asymptotically toward a limit
point that is never reached. The idea of a limit point of view increasing perspectives as
an abstraction is a view from nowhere. However, actual creatures, not abstract ones, as
the Jains taught us, always have a view from somewhere or somewhen. I don’t think
that Buddhists would sign up for a view from nowhere. Do Buddhists really advocate
the view that because we don’t actually have a self that is permanent and unchanging
in time each of us is a view from nowhere?
Let me now move on to Struhl’s important claims about extinguishing the illusion
of the self by modeling it on the Kanizsa-square illusion. Here is his hypothesis:
Perhaps what happens as we move further along the path is that we oscillate between first
seeing the illusion of the Kanizsa square, then, by careful attention, seeing that the square
does not exist; and then, as we step back from our attentional focus, once again seeing the
square even though we know cognitively that it does not exist. Through the careful
attention of vipassana, again in conjunction with other Buddhist practices, we can come to
experience a sense of selfless ness that can carry over and frame our experience outside of
meditative practice for a time. However, even as we move considerably along the path to
enlightenment and Nirvana, the sense of self returns at least at the phenomenal level, just
as the Kanizsa square illusion returns when we step back from close attention to the spaces
between any of the four black figures. (Struhl 2020, 133)

Without a doubt this is an interesting hypothesis. John Dunne once showed an
audience at Berkeley (Siderits was there) how the Kanizsa-triangle Illusion is
cognitively penetrable, figure 2 below.

Figure 2
For many, when they first look at the array of figures, a triangle pops out at them.
But if they know what a pac-man figure is, and they repeatedly say to themselves, “pac12

Two-dimensional creatures are described and discussed in relation to three-dimensional creatures in
Edwin Abbot's Classic, Flatland (1992).
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man,” eventually they extinguish the triangle figure, and see three pac-men
approaching the center. In another variation, if they know what a pizza pie looks like,
and they repeatedly say to themselves, “pizza slice,” they can come to see three pizzas,
each with a missing slice. So, in the Kanizsa-triangle figure we have cognitivepenetration along the axis of occurrent thoughts changing what we see. Nothing
important about cognitive penetration hangs on the difference between the triangle
version and the square version of the illusion. Now consider the Muller-Lyer illusion,
figure 3 below.

In the Muller-Lyer illusion no matter what we think, or come to believe, we will
see the lines as being of unequal length when they are in fact of equal length. Struhl
wants to say that the illusion of the self is like the Kanizsa-square illusion, subject to
cognitive penetration in a robust way, as opposed to the Muller-Lyer illusion, which is
cognitively impenetrable for the most part.13 Aare there any important differences
between these two illusions at the cognitive-phenomenal border? Here is a hypothesis.
The Kanizsa figures are completion illusions. In a completion illusion the
perceptual system takes information at one level of processing, prior to conscious
perception, and presents to consciousness the thing that is most likely to be out there in
the world, given the input and prior experience. In both the square and triangle case,
the relevant closed figure is pretty much there. So, given prior experience and Bayesian
inference through predictive processing, the system throws up to consciousness the
relevant closed figure. The main point is that something is completed based on the
input.
The Muller-Lyer lines are not completion illusions, everything is there. Rather,
when I ask you, “are the lines of equal length?” you judge that they are not because the
arrow edges lead you to see the internal lines as being of different length. But you don’t
complete any figure. In completion illusions cognitive penetration occurs in a concept
dependent way. If you possess the relevant concepts, pac-man and pizza slice, then
given the relation between these concepts and the perceptual array you can change what
you see. There is a mapping between the perceptual array and the concept. However,
13

I say for the most part because some people are not subject to the illusion at all. They don’t see the
lines as being of unequal length, whether or not they see them as the same length. There is cultural
variation on the Muller-Lyer illusion, but that cultural variation is not the same as conceptual variation
in the Kanizsa Square or Triangle illusion, here the illusion is dependent on having the concept of a
square or triangle. You won’t see the square or the triangle if you don’t possess the relevant concepts.
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in the Muller-Lyer illusion cognitive penetration cannot occur, since there is nothing to
complete, and the question is about length.
Struhl thinks that the illusion of the self is like the Kanizsa-square illusion. We can
phenomenally pop in and out of seeing the illusion. I would prefer to say that we can
go between different things we see on the model of the triangle to pac-man change
based on cognitive penetration. I will concede to Struhl that this can occur. But I want
to close my comments by challenging the propriety of this illusion as a model for the
illusion of the self. Before I do that, I will simply note the worry from before. The
Kanizsa figure illusions are illusions relative to a conscious subject with an epistemic
self with concepts that can undergo diachronic knowledge change. Who is the illusion
of the self an illusion for? I am sure Buddhists think that I am drastically confused, so
I will move on to another worry.
Look carefully at the Kanizsa-triangle illusion. No! Look very carefully. Do you
really see a closed figure that is a triangle? No! You don’t! What you see is a cognitive
completion of a perceptual array that remains incomplete in your perceptual field. You
see the corner bounded parts of the triangle with space for each of the three sides. You
don’t perceptually complete. You cognitively complete. Better yet, your perceptual
array suggests cognitively to you a completion. And when you are queried as to what
you see before you, you answer, “triangle.” So, if the illusion of the self is something
we can move in and out of, like we can in the Kanizsa figure illusions, we need to get
clear on how this could work. Consider the two cases.
Kanizsa-triangle illusion
1. S is such that at t1 a triangle is perceived at l.
2. S is such that at t2 no triangle is perceived at l.
3. In light of the change in what is perceived at l, S comes to believe that she was
the subject of an illusion based on a theory of illusion and what is perceived at
l at t2.
Self-illusion
4. S is such that at t1 a self is perceived at l.
5. S is such that at t2 no self is perceived at l.
6. In light of the change in what is perceived at l, S comes to believe that she was
the subject of an illusion based on a theory of illusion and what is perceived at
l at t2.
Putting aside the illusion for whom complaint, we are now in a position to look at
two other problems. In the Kanizsa-triangle case I don’t simply fail to see a triangle, I
also see something else, maybe pac-men figures, if that is what I have been thinking
about, but minimally the three circular figures with a missing piece. If the self-illusion
is modeled on the Kanizsa figures, it must be the case that I see the self, such that it can
be a perceptual illusion that is extinguished. But, again, as Hume correctly taught us,
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when we look inside, not perceptually, but introspectively, we don’t see a self –a
permanent thing in time, we see a bunch of changing phenomena. So, we don’t even
see the thing that is the illusion that is supposed to be extinguished. But now let us
suppose that we do. We face another problem. When we stop seeing the Kanizsatriangle, there is still something that we see, maybe pizza slices, if we are hungry. What
is it that we see when we stop seeing the self, even if only for 30 seconds, because
according to Struhl, we pop in and out of the illusion? Perhaps some Buddhists will
answer that we see the organized behavior of the aggregates arising and passing away.
But this seems to miss the mark as well, since when we look inside, as Hume instructs
us to do in our search for the permanent self, we already see a bundle of states arising
and passing away. What is all the work for, if what Hume tells us to do gets us there
directly.
To sum up. In the Kanizsa-triangle we do see a triangle (in a way) and it goes away,
by repeating ‘pac-man’ over and over again. Suppose there is some mantra that helps
the phenomenal illusion of the self disappear. First, we don’t ever seem to see that.
There appears to be a category mistake in the analogy. Second, when the mantra
extinguishes the supposed illusion of the self, what is it that we then come to see. In
the Kanizsa-triangle case we see pac-men. What about in the illusion of the self case?
Please don’t say the view from nowhere.
I don’t find the Buddhist account of the self as an illusion compelling at all, because
I don’t think there is an illusion of the self, although I think there might be a
metaphysical error in the Hindu account of the self as permanently unchanging. I do
think Struhl has done a wonderful job trying to make sense of the position by taking a
cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary approach and making it publicly accessible. I take
his work to be an excellent example of effortful publicly engaged cross-cultural and
multi-disciplinary philosophy. While the arguments and questions here are critical, they
come from a place of deep respect for the traditions and disciplines engaged. I often
find myself walking around in a circle thinking about Buddhist illusionism and
wrestling with the power of it. And Struhl works hard in his essay to bring an account
of their doctrines to the public in an accessible way.
Finally, while many have argued that metaphysics is necessary for soteriology, at
times I wonder if it really is. Easing suffering is about practices, which need not be so
much about believing whole doctrines and ontological views of the world, as they
simply might be about practices that do ease an individual’s suffering; be that heavy
metal band practice or group mindfulness meditation. Thank you Karsten!
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